MCP Warden
TomEageer/pulse
Gateway de segurança offline para servidores MCP com detecção em tempo real
Ver no GitHubGateway de segurança e scanner em tempo de execução para servidores MCP que bloqueia envenenamento de ferramentas, rug pulls, injeção de prompt e exfiltração de credenciais. Funciona offline, sem dependências, implementado em Go puro.
Instalação
npx convez-ai TomEageer/pulse1 comando no terminal: detecta o formato do repositório (marketplace ou plugin avulso) e instala via Claude Code. Requer Node 18+ e o Claude Code instalado.
Métricas
Casos de uso
- Auditoria de servidores MCP antes da integração em CI/CD
- Detecção de rug pulls comparando hash de ferramentas aprovadas
- Bloqueio de exfiltração de credenciais (AWS, GitHub, OpenAI, JWT)
- Proteção contra injeção de prompt em resultados de ferramentas
Veredito

Ferramenta essencial para quem opera servidores MCP em produção. Aborda um gap real de segurança com abordagem pragmática (offline, zero-dependency), mas reconhece honestamente suas limitações — detecção baseada em padrões, não contra obfuscação avançada. Recomendado como defesa em profundidade.
README
A tradução para o português deste README ainda está na fila.
mcp-warden
A security gateway and scanner for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. Runs fully offline — no LLM, no telemetry, no data leaves the process.
⚠️ Early development. APIs and detection rules will change.
Why this exists
MCP adoption outran its security tooling. Through 2026 researchers disclosed 40+ CVEs against MCP implementations, and scans keep finding that a large fraction of exposed MCP servers ship with no authentication at all. The common attacks are well known: tool poisoning (hidden instructions in a tool's metadata), rug pulls (a trusted tool silently changing its definition after approval), prompt injection delivered through tool results, and credential exfiltration.
The existing open-source tools (mcp-scan, Cisco's scanner, mcp-audit, …) are static — they inspect configs and metadata before/at install time. They do not see what actually flows at call time. The gateways (MCPX, ContextForge, …) focus on routing, auth, and governance, not threat enforcement.
mcp-warden fills the runtime gap: it sits inline between an MCP client and
server and inspects live JSON-RPC traffic, blocking the message when a critical
rule fires.
What it checks
| Class | When | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| Tool poisoning | tools/list | Instruction-like phrases or invisible-unicode in tool metadata |
| Rug pull | tools/list | A tool's hash changed since you pinned it (warden pin) |
| Prompt injection | tools/call result | Injection phrases / invisible unicode in returned content |
| Data exfiltration | tools/call args and results | AWS / GitHub / Slack / OpenAI / Google keys, private keys, JWTs |
Detection is deterministic and dependency-free (Go standard library only) — appropriate for a component in the trust path.
Install / build
go build -o warden ./cmd/warden # Go 1.25+
Use
Audit a server (CI-friendly — exits non-zero on a critical finding):
warden scan https://my-mcp-server.example.com/mcp
Pin the approved tool set, then detect later rug pulls:
warden pin https://my-mcp-server.example.com/mcp --out warden.lock.json
warden scan https://my-mcp-server.example.com/mcp --lock warden.lock.json
Run the inline gateway (warden.json):
{
"listen": "127.0.0.1:7000",
"upstream": "https://my-mcp-server.example.com/mcp",
"lockfile": "warden.lock.json",
"auditLog": "warden-audit.jsonl",
"blockOnCritical": true
}
warden proxy --config warden.json
# point your MCP client at http://127.0.0.1:7000 instead of the upstream
When a critical rule fires, Warden returns a JSON-RPC error to the client instead of forwarding the malicious message, and records the decision to the audit log.
Limitations (honest)
- Streamable HTTP transport only (stdio proxying not yet implemented).
- Pattern-based detection catches known shapes, not novel obfuscation; treat it as defense-in-depth, not a guarantee. An optional LLM-judge mode is on the roadmap but will remain off by default to preserve the offline guarantee.
- SSE response bodies are scanned as text (coarse) rather than fully parsed.
Contributions and rule submissions welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.md.
License
MIT — see LICENSE.