convez.ai
PluginUtilidadesIntermediário
smashbeat

Claude on Kindle

smashbeat/claude-on-kindle

Terminal Claude via Kindle e-ink — sem WebSocket, só HTML + tmux.

Ver no GitHub
InicialPluginScore · de 0 a 100

Plugin que permite controlar uma sessão Claude Code (ou qualquer terminal) via tmux desde um Kindle antigo ou navegador básico, sem WebSocket ou dependências. Funciona em dispositivos e-ink lançados até 2009, oferecendo leitura legível ao sol e bateria de semanas.

Instalação

$npx convez-ai smashbeat/claude-on-kindle

1 comando no terminal: detecta o formato do repositório (marketplace ou plugin avulso) e instala via Claude Code. Requer Node 18+ e o Claude Code instalado.

Métricas

Estrelas
1
Forks
0
Acompanhando
1
Saúde
42%
Último commit
há 5 meses
Versão
—
Issues abertas
0
Contribuidores
1

Casos de uso

  • Monitorar e controlar sessões Claude Code remotamente em dispositivos e-ink
  • Acessar terminal de baixa latência em ambientes de alta luminosidade (praia, exterior)
  • Estender autonomia de bateria em operações de longa duração sem recarga

Veredito

Projeto criativo que resolve um problema real (compatibilidade com hardware antigo) com engenharia minimalista — 90 linhas, sem dependências, só stdlib. Excelente para casos de uso específicos (e-ink + CLI), mas requer cuidado rigoroso com segurança (sempre atrás de proxy autenticado, CSRF-token, sem exposição na internet).

README

A tradução para o português deste README ainda está na fila.

Claude on Kindle

Drive a live Claude Code session — or any terminal — from a 2010 Kindle, or honestly any browser back to ~2009. No WebSocket, no JS framework, no canvas. Just HTML, forms, and tmux.

Claude Code running on a Kindle on the beach — e-ink stays readable in direct sun, 81% battery left

Built because the Kindle 3 e-ink browser (AppleWebKit/531, 2010) renders HTML and runs basic JS, but has no WebGL and no working WebSocket — so every modern web terminal (ttyd, Blit, wetty, gotty) shows a blank page. This one is dumb on purpose and just works.

The kindle-term UI, rendered at the Kindle 3's 600×800 screen

Why a Kindle?

Because of where you can use it. E-ink shines exactly where phones and laptops fail:

  • Readable in direct sunlight. E-ink is reflective like paper — the brighter the sun, the better it looks, while a phone or laptop screen washes out to glare. Read your terminal on the beach at noon.
  • Battery measured in weeks. An e-reader only draws power when the screen actually changes, so it barely sips. Keep a long Claude Code run going all afternoon — or all weekend — with no charger in sight.

Keep a Claude Code session running on a box at home, then check in on it (or drive it) from a Kindle out in the sun, on a battery that won't quit. No glare, no dead laptop in the sand.

How it works

your browser ─▶ [auth: Cloudflare Access / reverse proxy] ─▶ [cloudflared tunnel]
             ─▶ app.py (127.0.0.1:8882) ─▶ tmux session ─▶ your shell / Claude Code
  • app.py reads the visible tmux pane with tmux capture-pane and renders it inside a <pre>.
  • Buttons POST keystrokes, which are injected with tmux send-keys.
  • A content-hash auto-refresh keeps reloading while the screen is changing (so you watch output stream in) and auto-stops once it goes still — friendly to e-ink, which hates constant redraws.
  • ~90 lines, Python standard library only, zero dependencies.

⚠️ Security — read this

This serves a writable terminal, i.e. remote code execution for anyone who can reach it.

  • Keep it bound to 127.0.0.1 (the default).
  • Always put authentication in front — Cloudflare Access, an authenticated reverse proxy, or a VPN. Never expose it raw to the internet.
  • The POST endpoints are CSRF-protected (double-submit token: a cookie + a hidden form field that must match), so a cross-origin page can't drive your terminal using your authenticated session. Note that auth alone does not stop CSRF — the browser attaches your auth cookie automatically — which is why the token is built in. The cookie is HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict, and Secure when you set KT_SECURE=1 (do that behind HTTPS).
  • 127.0.0.1 is not a boundary against co-located processes. Anything else on the host that can reach loopback — another local service, or a --network=host Docker container (bridge-networked containers can't, by default) — can POST to the port directly, bypassing your auth proxy entirely. CSRF can't help there: such an attacker crafts the whole request. If the host also runs internet-facing services (a media server, cloud storage, …), treat a compromise of those as a path to this terminal. Mitigate (any of): run it where nothing untrusted shares the host; ensure no container is --network=host; restrict the port with a host firewall that allows only your proxy's process (match by uid or cgroup) and drops other local connections; have the app listen on a 0600 Unix socket your proxy connects to (a filesystem boundary even host-networked containers can't cross); and/or require a proxy-injected secret header (below).
  • Run it as a non-root user (see the systemd/ examples). Otherwise a bug — or the path above — is a root shell, not a contained account.
  • Optional: require a proxy-injected secret header. Set KT_AUTH_HEADER + KT_AUTH_SECRET; the app then 403s any request missing that header, so a process reaching the port directly (not through your proxy) is rejected. Have your trusted proxy inject the header server-side — the browser never sees it, so it stays ancient-browser-compatible:
    • nginx: proxy_set_header X-KT-Auth your-secret;
    • Caddy: header_up X-KT-Auth your-secret
    • Traefik: a headers middleware with customRequestHeaders.
    • Cloudflare: injecting a request header needs Transform Rules or Snippets, which are paid (Pro+); on the Free plan use an OS-level option above (host firewall / Unix socket) instead.

Quick start (local)

tmux new-session -d -s claude          # or any session name
python3 app.py                         # serves http://127.0.0.1:8882
# open http://127.0.0.1:8882 in a browser on the same machine

Config via env vars (defaults shown): KT_SESSION=claude, KT_HOST=127.0.0.1, KT_PORT=8882, KT_TITLE=<session>.

Remote access (the Kindle use case)

  1. Run app.py bound to localhost — see systemd/kindle-term.service.example.
  2. Expose it with a Cloudflare Tunnel: install cloudflared, create a named tunnel, add a Public Hostname → http://localhost:8882. The token goes in an env file (.env.example, systemd/cloudflared.service.example). No inbound ports are opened.
  3. Gate it with Cloudflare Access: add a self-hosted application for your hostname with a policy (Google SSO, one-time PIN, your IdP, …). Now only you can reach it.

For a tmux session that survives reboots, see systemd/claude-session.service.example.

Controls

ButtonDoes
Send⏎send your typed text + Enter (submit)
Sendsend your text without Enter
Enter / ↑ / ↓ / Esc / Tab / ^C / ⌫send that single key (history, menus, interrupt, …)
↻ Refreshre-read the screen once
▶ Watchauto-refresh while the screen changes, auto-stop when idle

A full in-app guide lives at /help.

Bonus: Claude account switcher (optional)

If you drive Claude Code and keep two accounts (e.g. work + personal) and don't want to mix them, bin/claude-acct snapshots and swaps the Claude login (~/.claude/.credentials.json) cleanly — leaving your MCP/plugin logins untouched — and bin/cwork / bin/cpers switch + relaunch. Claude-specific; skip it if you're driving a plain shell. Setup is in the header of bin/claude-acct.

Why "dumb on purpose"

Capability probe on a Kindle 3 (AppleWebKit/531, 2010): HTML ✓, basic JS ✓, WebGL ✗, WebSocket ✗. Modern web terminals stream over a WebSocket; this one never opens one — it's plain page loads and tmux. That's the whole trick.

License

MIT © Alessandro Grassi

Ver o original no GitHub

Bom para

Relacionados