MCP Redteam - Auditor de Segurança para MCP Servers
m0rvayne/mcp-redteam
Audita MCP servers, encontra RCE e vulnerabilidades, gera relatórios interativos
Ver no GitHubFerramenta de teste de segurança ativo para MCP servers que combina análise de código-fonte, exploração ao vivo e correção automática. Detecta vulnerabilidades como RCE, injeção, path traversal e problemas de configuração em connectors MCP através de análise estática (Semgrep) e comportamental com IA.
Instalação
npx convez-ai m0rvayne/mcp-redteam1 comando no terminal: detecta o formato do repositório (marketplace ou plugin avulso) e instala via Claude Code. Requer Node 18+ e o Claude Code instalado.
Métricas
Casos de uso
- Auditoria de segurança em MCP servers antes de produção
- Detecção de código vulnerável (RCE, injeção, SSRF) em connectors MCP
- Verificação de saúde de configuração (credenciais expostas, servidores zumbis)
- Integração em CI/CD com relatórios SARIF no GitHub Security
- Análise de cadeias de ataque cross-server entre múltiplos connectors
Veredito

Ferramenta madura e bem-testada (75+ testes) que resolve um problema real: auditar MCP servers em produção. Suporta tanto análise determinística em CLI quanto profunda via Claude Code plugin. Saída SARIF pronta para CI/CD e histórico de auditorias. Recomendado para times que deployam múltiplos MCP connectors.
README
A tradução para o português deste README ainda está na fila.
It doesn't tell you where your walls are thin. It walks through them.
I build MCP connectors and AI automation for businesses. 70+ connectors deployed across client projects. Some of them started acting up — dropping connections, config conflicts, servers I forgot to remove still sitting in config eating resources.
Went looking for something to audit this. Found mcp-scan — only reads tool descriptions, doesn't touch source code. Cisco's scanner — 78% false positives. Nothing that actually reads the server code and says "line 42, you have exec() with unsanitized input."
Built my own. Ran it on 106 public MCP servers. 7 had remote code execution. One of them had 25K GitHub stars.
Open-sourced because if my connectors had these problems, so do yours.
Two modes of operation:
- Claude Code plugin — reads source code, probes tools, detects behavioral mismatches, maps cross-server attack chains. Interactive HTML report.
- Standalone CLI — deterministic scan. 25 Semgrep rules, config health checks, SARIF output. Works in CI/CD without Claude.
What works today
| Feature | Status | How |
|---|---|---|
| Config health scanner | Working | Dead servers, scope conflicts, credential exposure, supply chain, CVE checks |
| Semgrep code analysis | Working | 14 rules (Python + JS/TS): injection, traversal, SSRF, eval, secrets, stdout |
| SARIF output | Working | GitHub Security tab integration |
| JSON output | Working | Machine-readable for CI/CD |
| Terminal output | Working | Rich colored tables with risk scores |
| CI exit codes | Working | --fail-on critical returns exit 1 |
| LLM behavioral analysis | Working | Anthropic SDK, behavioral mismatch detection (optional) |
| Audit history | Working | JSONL log, cross-run comparison (new/confirmed/fixed) |
| Self-security audit | Working | 10 vulnerabilities found and fixed in own code |
| Claude Code plugin | Working | AI-driven deep audit with HTML report |
| 75+ tests | Passing | Unit, security, stress, edge cases, Hypothesis fuzzing |
What doesn't work yet
- Cross-server chain detection in CLI (exists in Claude Code plugin only)
- Auto-fix in CLI (exists in Claude Code plugin only)
- HTML report generation in CLI
- MCPTox benchmark validation
- Community rule contributions
Install
Claude Code plugin (deep AI-native audit):
claude plugin marketplace add m0rvayne/mcp-redteam
claude plugin install mcp-redteam
/mcp-redteam
Standalone CLI (deterministic, CI/CD ready):
pip install redteam-mcp
mcp-redteam scan ./your-mcp-server --no-llm
Remote MCP server (via URL, OAuth or token):
mcp-redteam scan-remote https://your-server.com/mcp --token <bearer>
Requires Python 3.10+. Semgrep installed separately for code analysis: pip install semgrep.
What it checks
Config Health (deterministic)
Dead/disconnected servers, scope conflicts (same server in multiple scopes), credentials in git-tracked config files (CVE-2025-59536), unpinned npx/uvx packages (supply chain), enableAllProjectMcpServers bypass (CVE-2026-21852), orphaned MCP processes.
Code Security (Semgrep, 25 rules)
| Rule | What it detects | Languages |
|---|---|---|
| Shell injection | subprocess + shell=True with user input | Python |
| Path traversal | open()/Path() without realpath check | Python, JS/TS |
| SSRF | HTTP requests with user-controlled URL | Python, JS/TS |
| Eval injection | eval()/exec()/new Function() with user input | Python, JS/TS |
| Hardcoded secrets | API keys, tokens, passwords in source | Python, JS/TS |
| Stdout pollution | print()/console.log() in stdio handlers | Python, JS/TS |
| Missing error handling | Tool functions without try/catch | Python, JS/TS |
| Credential in response | API keys/tokens in tool return values | Python, JS/TS |
| Missing signal handler | Server without SIGTERM/SIGINT | Python |
| Blocking sync calls | requests.get() inside async functions | Python |
| OAuth over-privilege | Excessive OAuth scopes (gmail.modify, admin) | Python |
| No timeout on HTTP | httpx/requests/fetch without timeout | Python, JS/TS |
| No timeout on subprocess | subprocess/spawn without timeout | Python, JS/TS |
| Dangerous parameter names | Tool params named cmd, exec, eval, code | JS/TS |
| Env secrets without rotation | API keys from os.getenv used directly | Python |
Based on 48+ CVEs, OWASP MCP Top 10, and research from Invariant Labs, Trail of Bits, Palo Alto Unit 42, OX Security, and Snyk.
LLM Behavioral Analysis (optional, requires API key)
- Behavioral mismatch: tool description claims X, code does Y
- Hidden operations: undeclared network requests, file writes, subprocess calls
- Credential mishandling: secrets logged, leaked in errors, stored insecurely
How it compares
| mcp-scan (Snyk) | Cisco MCP Scanner | mcp-redteam | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Approach | Static description scan | YARA + LLM-as-judge | Semgrep taint + LLM behavioral |
| Reads source code | No | Python only | Yes — Python + JS/TS |
| Config validation | No | Config discovery | Yes — 6 checks, CVE detection |
| Behavioral mismatch | No | No | Yes (LLM layer) |
| SARIF output | No | No | Yes |
| CI exit codes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Self-tested | Unknown | Unknown | 75+ tests, self-security audit |
| Cloud dependency | Snyk API required | Cisco API (optional) | No — fully local |
Why not just use mcp-scan?
mcp-scan reads what a server says about itself — tool descriptions. mcp-redteam checks what a server actually does — source code analysis + behavioral analysis.
A server with clean descriptions but leaky code: mcp-scan passes it. We catch it.
Real findings mcp-scan cannot detect (they live in code, not descriptions):
- Trello API keys in
.envcommitted to git - Instagram session cookies stored in plaintext
- AppleScript injection via unescaped clipboard input
- Google OAuth tokens with permissions
644
Audit History
Each audit saves a compact JSONL log to ~/Desktop/redteam-results/. On the next run, mcp-redteam reads previous results and compares:
- confirmed — found again, higher confidence
- new — first time seeing this
- fixed — was in previous audit, now gone
This turns LLM non-determinism into an advantage: each run is a new perspective, the intersection is ground truth.
Architecture
/mcp-redteam
|
+-----------------+
| Phase 0: Config |
+-----------------+
|
+-----------+
| Discovery |
+-----------+
|
| 1 server = 1 agent
|
+----------+ +----------+ +----------+ +----------+
| Agent-01 | | Agent-02 | | Agent-03 | | Agent-N |
| youtube | | trello | | instagram| | server-N |
| health | | health | | health | | health |
| arch | | arch | | arch | | arch |
| complete | | complete | | complete | | complete |
| security | | security | | security | | security |
+----+-----+ +----+-----+ +----+-----+ +----+-----+
| | | |
+------+-----+-----+------+
|
+-------------------------+
| Chain analysis + report |
+-------------------------+
|
+----------------+
| HTML + Fix |
+----------------+
Tests
75+ tests across 6 test files:
- test_semgrep.py — each vulnerable fixture detected, each benign fixture clean
- test_self_security.py — 21 tests: our own code audited for vulnerabilities
- test_stress.py — 1000/10000 findings, concurrent scans, unicode
- test_fuzzing.py — Hypothesis property-based: any input, no crash
- test_edge_cases.py — corrupt JSON, missing files, null bytes, timeouts
- test_models.py + test_formatters.py — unit tests for core logic
Current Limitations
- Plugin requires Claude Code with connected MCP servers
- CLI requires semgrep for code analysis (graceful skip if not installed)
- LLM analysis requires ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
- Destructive tests intentionally skipped — read-only probing only
- Source code analysis works for local servers; pip/npm packages may have limited access
- Plugin report quality scales with model capability (Opus > Sonnet > Haiku)
- False positive rate not yet measured on production MCP servers
Known False Positive Patterns
- SSRF rule triggers on
httpx.get()with URL built from config, not user input - Path traversal rule triggers on
open()where path is validated but validation isn't recognized as sanitizer - Stdout pollution flags
print()in__main__block (safe, not in MCP handler)
Docs
The docs/ folder is useful independently:
- attack-playbook.md — 18 attack categories, 48+ CVEs, payloads and detection methods
- best-practices.md — MCP server security checklist
- reference-server.md — secure server templates (Python + Node.js)
References
- OWASP MCP Top 10
- Invariant Labs — Tool Poisoning Attacks
- Trail of Bits — MCP Security Layer
- Palo Alto Unit 42 — MCP Attack Vectors
- OX Security — STDIO Design Flaw
- NSA — MCP Security Guidance
- Vulnerable MCP Project