vcp-servers
hassard0/vcp-servers
Reference implementations of VCP (Verifiable Capability Protocol) in TypeScript, Python, Go, and Rust — a lightweight SDK + MCP bridge and a heavy enforcing gateway in each, driven by shared conformance vectors. Implements hassard0/vcp.
Instalação
npx convez-ai hassard0/vcp-servers1 comando no terminal: detecta o formato do repositório (marketplace ou plugin avulso) e instala via Claude Code. Requer Node 18+ e o Claude Code instalado.
Métricas
README
A tradução para o português deste README ainda está na fila.
vcp-servers
Reference implementations of the Verifiable Capability Protocol (VCP) in TypeScript, Python, Go, and Rust. Each language ships two pieces:
- a lightweight SDK (the client/Host + Planner side, plus an MCP→VCP bridge) — it builds and verifies signed capability manifests, content-addresses capabilities, computes argument hashes, proposes plans, and wraps legacy MCP tools; it holds no authority.
- a heavy Gateway (the enforcing trust boundary) — it verifies manifests, evaluates policy, mints single-use proof-bound grants, runs the taint/data-flow engine, verifies attestations, and emits signed audit events.
All four are driven by the same language-agnostic conformance vectors in
conformance/, so "VCP-compliant" is mechanically checkable across
languages rather than asserted per-implementation. The spec revision they target is
pinned in SPEC_PIN.json.
Get started in 60 seconds
make # list every target
make example # run the 30-line "hello VCP" in every language
make test # run every suite
# or pick one language — each is just the native tool:
cd typescript && npm install && npm run example
cd python && python examples/hello.py
cd rust && cargo run -p vcp-gateway --example hello
cd go && go run ./examples/hello
Each examples/hello builds and signs a capability, shows its content-addressed id,
then runs it through the gateway (verify → policy → single-use grant → invoke →
verify attestation) and prints the result — the whole VCP loop in ~30 lines. From
there, each language's README has a Quickstart and a Public API overview, and
the examples/ + npm run demo/demo:obo show the full §16 and §26
scenarios. One-click dev env: open in a devcontainer (all four
toolchains provisioned).
Conformance matrix
| Language | SDK | Gateway + Server | Conformance vectors | Local test status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TypeScript | typescript/packages/sdk | typescript/packages/{gateway,server} | ✅ all 10 | ✅ 57/57 (node --test) |
| Python | python/vcp_sdk | python/{vcp_gateway,vcp_server} | ✅ all 10 | ✅ 81/81 (unittest) |
| Rust | rust/crates/vcp-sdk | rust/crates/vcp-gateway | ✅ all 10 | ✅ 45/45 (cargo test) |
| Go | go/sdk | go/gateway | ✅ all 10 | ⏳ authored stdlib-only; verified in CI (go test ./...) |
The Go reference was written against the spec and vectors but authored on a host without a Go toolchain; it is compiled and tested in CI. See
go/README.md.
The eight conformance vectors every implementation reproduces:
canonical-hash (JCS + SHA-256), capability-identity (contract hash ⇒ identity,
mutation ⇒ new identity), argument-binding (argument hash), grant-rules
(audience / argument / replay / expiry verdicts), taint (label propagation,
authority-from-tainted denial, data-flow blocking), reason-codes (the §23
registry), delegation (on-behalf-of chain + per-provider credential binding +
attenuation), task-rules (task lifecycle: subject scope, expiry, cancel⇒revoke), and
environment-attestation (optional §27 actor attestation: not-required / valid /
missing / wrong-nonce / untrusted-build / expired), and command (§28 CLI/command:
argv resolution + hash, shell metacharacters stay one literal argv element, path
escape ⇒ SANDBOX_VIOLATION, tainted output, exec_digest identity).
Run the tests
# TypeScript (Node 18+)
cd typescript && npm install && npm test
# Python 3.10+
cd python && python -m unittest discover -s . -p "test_*.py" -t .
# Rust 1.74+
cd rust && cargo test
# Go 1.22+
cd go && go test ./...
What each implementation demonstrates
- Identity = contract hash. Changing any contract field (e.g. widening
sandbox.network) yields a newcapability_id— a silent rug pull becomes a new, unapproved capability. - Single-use proof-bound grants. A grant is rejected if reused, if the arguments were changed after approval, if addressed to a different capability, or if expired.
- Authority never flows from tainted data. Data from a resource or a tool result
cannot authorize an action; the gateway rejects plans whose authority derives from
untrusted_*labels. - Data-flow blocking. A
confidential → externalmovement is denied even when the planner proposes it; the same data may flow as bounded metadata to an allowed sink. - MCP bridge. A legacy MCP tool is wrapped with
provenance: "legacy_mcp", its observed schema/description hash pinned, and its raw description is never passed to the model as instruction.
Runnable demos
| Demo | Command | Shows |
|---|---|---|
| §16 calendar | cd typescript && npm run demo · cd python && python -m vcp_server.demo | plan/apply, dry-run approval, injection contained |
| §26 multi-provider OBO | cd typescript && npm run demo:obo · cd python && python -m vcp_server.demo_obo | one approval → fan-out to gmail/linear/slack, per-provider token exchange, delegation-chain audit, blocked confidential → external flow |
Examples
examples/ contains the spec's §16 walkthrough — "Look at Alex's
email and schedule the demo" — run end to end through a gateway, including the case
where a prompt injection hidden in the email is contained.
License
Apache-2.0. See LICENSE. The protocol specification it implements is at hassard0/vcp.