SIFT-Eye: Agente DFIR Autônomo
4KInc/sift-eye
Agente DFIR autônomo com garantias arquiteturais de integridade forense
Ver no GitHubAgente de perícia digital e resposta a incidentes (DFIR) autônomo construído sobre a SANS SIFT Workstation. Integra Claude Code como framework de raciocínio com um MCP Server Python que encapsula 200+ ferramentas SIFT como funções tipadas e arquiteturalmente somente-leitura, garantindo integridade forense das evidências.
Instalação
npx convez-ai 4KInc/sift-eye1 comando no terminal: detecta o formato do repositório (marketplace ou plugin avulso) e instala via Claude Code. Requer Node 18+ e o Claude Code instalado.
Métricas
Casos de uso
- Análise automatizada de imagens de disco (E01, raw) com triage inicial
- Análise de memória com Volatility 3 para detectar processos injetados e atividade de rede
- Investigações forenses integradas (disco + memória) com correlação cruzada automática
- Geração de relatórios periciais estruturados com citação de artefatos
Veredito

Solução robusta e bem arquitetada para automação de investigações DFIR em nível empresarial. A abordagem híbrida Claude Code + MCP Server com garantias arquiteturais (não apenas prompt-based) diferencia-se positivamente no ecossistema forense. Requer expertise em DFIR e infraestrutura SIFT para máximo valor.
README
A tradução para o português deste README ainda está na fila.
SIFT-Eye: Autonomous DFIR Agent
An autonomous digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) agent built on the SANS SIFT Workstation. SIFT-Eye uses Claude Code as the agentic framework and a custom Python MCP server that wraps 200+ SIFT tools as typed, architecturally read-only functions.
Architecture
Claude Code (Agentic Framework)
├── CLAUDE.md - Senior analyst persona + investigation methodology
├── Skills - Phased investigation (triage > timeline > memory > correlate > report)
│
└── MCP Client ──── stdio ──── sift-eye-mcp (Python MCP Server)
├── Disk tools (Sleuthkit, ewftools)
├── Memory tools (Volatility 3)
├── Analysis tools (RegRipper, plaso, YARA, strings)
├── Integrity layer (SHA-256 evidence hashing)
└── Audit logger (every tool call → audit_log.jsonl)
Why Hybrid?
- Claude Code provides autonomous reasoning, self-correction, and narrative generation
- MCP Server provides architectural evidence protection -destructive commands physically cannot be invoked because the server doesn't expose them. This is not a prompt restriction; it's a code constraint.
Security Boundaries
| Boundary | Enforcement | Type |
|---|---|---|
| Evidence read-only | MCP server has no write tools for evidence paths | Architectural |
| Output isolation | All outputs to /tmp/sift-eye/case_*/ only | Architectural |
| Evidence integrity | SHA-256 hash before/after analysis | Architectural |
| Investigation methodology | CLAUDE.md + Skills | Prompt-based |
| Accuracy standards | CLAUDE.md rules | Prompt-based |
Setup on SIFT Workstation
Prerequisites
- SANS SIFT Workstation (VM or bare metal) -Download
- Protocol SIFT installed:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/teamdfir/protocol-sift/main/install.sh | bash - Claude Code:
npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code - Python 3.11+
Installation
# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/4KInc/sift-eye.git
cd sift-eye
# Install the MCP server
cd mcp-server
pip install -e .
cd ..
# Verify MCP server starts
python3 -m sift_eye_mcp.server --help
Running an Investigation
# Start Claude Code in the sift-eye directory
cd sift-eye
claude
# Then tell the agent what to investigate:
# "Investigate the disk image at /evidence/rocba-cdrive.e01 and the memory dump at /evidence/rocba-memory.raw"
Claude Code will:
- Hash all evidence files (integrity baseline)
- Run initial triage (partitions, OS, user accounts)
- Generate a super timeline
- Analyze Windows artifacts (registry, prefetch, event logs)
- Analyze memory (processes, network, injected code)
- Cross-correlate disk and memory findings (self-correction)
- Generate an investigative report with artifact citations
Manual Skill Invocation
You can also invoke individual investigation phases:
/triage -Run initial disk triage
/memory-analysis -Analyze memory dump
/correlate -Cross-correlate and self-correct
/report -Generate final report
Output
All output goes to /tmp/sift-eye/case_<timestamp>/:
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
evidence_hashes.json | SHA-256 hashes of all evidence files |
findings.jsonl | Structured findings (one per line) |
audit_log.jsonl | Every tool call with timestamp, args, output hash, duration |
report.md | Investigative narrative |
timeline.csv | Super timeline (if generated) |
artifacts/ | Extracted artifacts |
Finding Format
{
"id": "MEM-003",
"severity": "HIGH",
"title": "Injected code detected in PID 1234",
"description": "MZ header found in non-image memory region of explorer.exe",
"artifact_path": "memory @ 0x7ff12340000",
"tool_used": "mem_malfind",
"confidence": "CONFIRMED",
"raw_output_ref": "audit_log.jsonl:sequence:42"
}
Audit Log Format
{
"sequence": 42,
"timestamp": "2026-06-14T20:15:33.123Z",
"tool": "mem_malfind",
"arguments": {"memory_path": "/evidence/rocba-memory.raw"},
"output_hash": "a1b2c3d4...",
"output_bytes": 15234,
"duration_ms": 3421.5,
"success": true
}
Self-Correction
SIFT-Eye's cross-correlation phase compares findings across evidence sources and documents contradictions:
- Expected vs Found -What the agent expected to find vs what it actually found
- Hypothesis -Possible explanations for the discrepancy
- Test -Targeted tool execution to resolve the contradiction
- Resolution -Updated finding with corrected information
Example:
EXPECTED: Process
svchost.exe(PID 1234) found in prefetch should appear in memory process list. FOUND: Not in mem_pslist output. HYPOTHESIS: Process exited before memory capture; OR anti-forensics hiding the process. TEST: Checked mem_pstree for orphaned children; checked prefetch timestamp vs memory capture time. RESOLUTION: Prefetch last-run time (14:32:05) is 3 hours before memory capture (17:45:12). Process executed and exited normally. Not suspicious.
MCP Server Tools (35 total)
Evidence Integrity (4)
hash_evidence, check_integrity, get_case_dir, get_audit_stats
Disk Forensics (7)
disk_ewfinfo, disk_mmls, disk_fls, disk_icat, disk_file_type, disk_fsstat, disk_recover_deleted
Memory Forensics (13)
mem_pslist, mem_pstree, mem_netscan, mem_cmdline, mem_malfind, mem_dlllist, mem_filescan, mem_handles, mem_hivelist, mem_printkey, mem_hashdump, mem_envars, mem_svcscan
Analysis (8)
compute_hash, search_strings, run_yara, run_regripper, run_log2timeline, run_psort, run_exiftool, carve_files
Tested Against
The Fred Rocba Case (SANS HACKATHON-2026 Standard Forensic Case):
rocba-cdrive.e01-22.1 GB E01 disk image (Windows system)Rocba-Memory.zip-5.3 GB memory dump- Scenario: Break-in and IP theft at Stark Research Labs
License
MIT